Prasad Mahendragiri v. State of Kerala (Crl.M.C. No. 1240 of 2026), Kerala High Court, 16 September 2026, Justice Jobin Sebastian
Facts of the Case
The petitioner was the sole accused in a case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kalpetta. He was charged-sheeted under Sections 354A(1)(iv), 294(b), 506(ii) and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860.
The prosecution alleged that on 9 March 2024, at a temple premises in Kalpetta, the accused abused one witness (CW2) in filthy language “due to prior enmity”. Later, when CW1 and CW3 went to question him on the public road in front of his house, he allegedly abused them again, made “sexually coloured remarks”, and threatened to do away with them while showing a machete.
He asked the High Court to quash the final report and all further proceedings. He argued that even if the First Information Statement was accepted in full, no offence was made out.
What Did the Court Say?
The court allowed the petition in part, taking the charges one by one.
- Section 354A(1)(iv) (sexual harassment) was quashed:
The court held that the mere use of obscene words does not automatically attract this offence. There must be a specific allegation of sexually coloured remarks.
“A general abuse directed at a woman does not, by itself, constitute an offence under Section 354A(1)(iv) of the IPC.”
- Section 506 (criminal intimidation) continues:
The FIS specifically alleged that the accused came armed with a machete and threatened the complainant and CW3. The court found the essential ingredients prima facie made out.
- Section 294(b) (obscene words in a public place): continues.
The court found it prima facie discernible that the abusive words were uttered in a public place. Whether the words were actually obscene, or could generate impure thoughts in the audience, can be decided only after trial.
- Section 509 (insulting the modesty of a woman): continues.
The court was clear that foul language alone is not enough.
“The use of filthy language against a woman, without an intention to insult her modesty, is not sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 509 of the IPC.”
“…the intention to insult the modesty of a woman is an indispensable ingredient of the offence.”
The order records specific alleged remarks, in Malayalam. Whether they were uttered with that intention was held to be “a matter of evidence, which can be determined only after trial.”
The court also clarified that its observations are confined to this petition and “shall not influence the trial court in any manner.”
Learnings for Organisations
While this is a criminal case, it offers a useful lesson for workplace complaint handling.
- Not every rude or abusive act is “sexual harassment”, and not every one is harmless. The court separated general abuse from conduct that meets the specific ingredients of an offence. Your POSH and conduct policies should do the same. Define sexual harassment clearly, and give your Internal Committee a framework for classifying conduct accurately, including conduct that is serious but falls under general misconduct or other policies.
- Be specific when recording complaints. The court’s reasoning turned on whether there was a specific allegation of sexually coloured remarks. Complaint intake should capture exactly what was said or done, when, where, and in whose presence. Vague descriptions make it harder to assess a complaint properly.
- Intent and context matter, and they are matters of evidence. The court said intent could only be assessed on evidence. Inquiries should likewise gather facts and context before reaching conclusions.
- One incident can raise several issues at once. Here, abuse, obscenity, and a threat with a weapon sat together. A good process lets each aspect be assessed and acted on, rather than forcing everything into one label.