Introduction
April 2026 has produced a cluster of significant judicial pronouncements under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (the PoSH Act).
Taken together, these decisions address some of the most contested questions in the statute’s implementation: What is the mandatory force of an Internal Committee’s (IC) recommendations? Can IC members be punished for their findings? Who may constitute an inquiry body? When is suspension lawful? And where precisely does criminal law draw the line between workplace incivility and sexual harassment? For employers, HR practitioners, legal counsel, and IC members, keeping pace with this evolving jurisprudence is a compliance imperative.
1. [Petitioner] v. [Respondent Co-operative Society] & ICC
Gujarat High Court, Justice Hemant M. Prachchhak
Brief Facts
A female Assistant Manager at a co-operative milk federation alleged that the Managing Director physically assaulted her, held her wrist, and, along with a female Deputy Manager, forcibly snatched her mobile phone. She filed complaints before the employer, the police, and the State Human Rights Commission. A counter-complaint was simultaneously filed against her before the IC by the Deputy Manager, alleging that she had circulated defamatory pamphlets containing the Deputy Manager’s photographs and insinuating an illicit relationship with the Managing Director. CCTV footage and a police investigation indicated that the photographs were recovered from the petitioner’s phone.
The IC, whose majority members were direct subordinates of the Managing Director, the very person accused, found the petitioner’s complaint false and baseless, recommended disciplinary action against her under Section 14, and forwarded the counter-complaint to the police as credible. The petitioner was subsequently terminated and challenged the IC’s Final Report before the Gujarat High Court.
Issues Raised before the Court
- Is the writ petition maintainable against a co-operative society?
- Is the Section 18 appeal remedy efficacious/available?
- Does the IC report warrant interference?
What the Court Said & Legal Analysis
On Maintainability:
The Court held that Respondent No. 1, registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, does not qualify as ‘State’ under Article 12. Applying the cumulative Ajay Hasia tests, including financial dependence, administrative domination, public function, state-conferred monopoly, and relying on Thalappalam Service Co-op. Bank, K.K. Saksena, S.S. Rana, and the Bombay HC’s Gajanan M. Naik v. Goa State Co-Op. Milk Producers’ Union, the Court found the federation failed all tests. Crucially, it also held that even where a body performs some public duty, not every decision carries a public law element. A service or employment dispute does not automatically attract Article 226 jurisdiction.
On Alternative Remedy:
The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that no efficacious appellate forum exists. It held that Section 18 of the PoSH Act, read with Rule 11, provides an appeal to the authority notified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, thereby constituting an efficacious statutory remedy. The petitioner’s contention that the IE(SO) Act stands repealed by the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (from 21 November 2025) was not accepted.
On the IC Report:
The Court found no illegality in the IC’s proceedings and declined to interfere. It expressly recorded that the IC “completely followed the framework as provided under Section 11 of the PoSH Act” and submitted its report in compliance with the law, examining CCTV footage, the police investigation report, and submissions from both parties. The Court found “no bias operating in the mind of the IC” and held that the IC had complied with all principles of natural justice by giving adequate opportunity of hearing and carefully assessing the entire body of evidence before dismissing the complaint. The Court was “in complete agreement” with the Final Report.
On Section 14 and the “Reverse Bias” Observation:
The Court emphasised that Section 14 of the PoSH Act provides express protection against false and malicious complaints, and that the IC’s recommendation to take disciplinary action against the petitioner, having found that she had “made the allegation of sexual harassment, knowing the same to be false and incorrect” and had “consciously concealed material facts,” aligned with the statutory scheme.
In this context, the Court observed that in sexual harassment cases, adjudicating forums must be careful that “a reverse bias does not operate against the involved male accused, since the statute itself provides sufficient protection,” and warned that “a double layer of protection, if extended by adjudicating forums to the complainant, might be counterproductive, since excessive abuse of the provisions of the statute will create more glass ceilings than they remove, creating fetters in the employment of genuinely competent and hard-working employees.” The Court also reiterated the limited scope of judicial review, stating that writ courts must not substitute their own opinion for that of the adjudicating authority absent patent unreasonableness, arbitrariness, mala fides, or perversity.
Key Takeaway for Organisations
The judgment reinforces three settled propositions:
- A co-operative society registered under State legislation is not ipso facto ‘State’ under Article 12 and is therefore not amenable to writ jurisdiction in service matters;
- Section 18 of the PoSH Act, read with Rule 11, provides an efficacious statutory appellate remedy that ordinarily must be exhausted before approaching the writ court; and
- Section 14 is a substantive safeguard that ICs are entitled to invoke where, after due inquiry, a complaint is found to be false or malicious.
The ‘reverse bias’ observation underscores that the protections under the PoSH Act run alongside, and not in derogation of, the rights of the accused. ICs must inquire fairly into both sides, and where evidence establishes that a complaint is false, Section 14 may properly be invoked.
2. Km. Sunita Devi & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), Justice Manish Mathur
Brief Facts
A complaint of sexual harassment was lodged against a departmental officer, following which an IC was constituted under the PoSH Act. The Committee conducted its inquiry and submitted a report exonerating the accused officer. The complainant thereafter raised concerns about the conduct of the proceedings, alleging that the Committee had disregarded corroborative witness testimony and placed undue reliance on irrelevant material, and submitted an audio recording of the proceedings in support. On this basis, the employer initiated disciplinary proceedings against the Committee members and placed them under suspension. The Committee members challenged the suspension orders before the High Court.
Issues Raised before the Court
- Are IC recommendations under Section 13(3) of the PoSH Act mandatory or directory?
- Can IC members be suspended and subjected to departmental proceedings solely based on their findings?
What the Court Said & Legal Analysis
On the mandatory nature of IC recommendations:
Reading Sections 11, 13, 18, and 26 of the PoSH Act purposively, the Court held that once the IC delivers its findings, no further inquiry by the employer is contemplated. It held that once such an inquiry is completed, “no further inquiry is contemplated” under service rules, and the role of the employer is confined to acting upon the findings in accordance with applicable provisions. Section 18 permits appeals only against the IC’s recommendations, not against any employer action taken thereafter, and Section 26(1)(b) penalises employers who fail to act on those recommendations. Although Section 13(3) uses the word “recommendation,” the Court held that a construction treating the findings as merely advisory would defeat the statute’s entire scheme. The IC’s report is therefore mandatory in nature and binding on the employer.
On departmental action against IC members:
The Court accepted in principle that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against IC members where there is prima facie material showing reckless or corrupt conduct in the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions. However, disagreeing with an IC’s findings is not such material. The suspension orders here failed to record any prima facie satisfaction of extraneous motive, distinguish between the correctness of the decision and misconduct in discharging quasi-judicial duty, or record the subjective satisfaction required under Rule 4 of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999. They were, in the Court’s words, passed “in a very cursory manner” without any application of mind.
The Court also flagged the broader structural concern. IC members who face departmental action whenever their findings displease the employer cannot deliberate freely. A chilling effect on IC independence would, over time, obviate the very purpose of the Act.
Key Takeaway for Organisations
IC findings under Section 13 are binding. Employers must act on them within 60 days and cannot substitute their own inquiry. Disciplinary action against IC members requires specific, articulable evidence of misconduct in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Mere disagreement with the outcome does not suffice.
3. Shrinivas Shinde v. Directorate of Skill Development & Ors.
Bombay High Court (Goa Bench), Justice Dr Neela Gokhale
Brief Facts
The Petitioner, a Low Division Clerk with the Directorate of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship, was accused of sexual harassment by a female colleague. Within weeks, she retracted her complaint, stating in a detailed letter that the Principal of the Institute, Dattaprasad Palni, had forced her to sign a false complaint and threatened her with dire consequences if she refused.
The IC conducted a preliminary inquiry, accepted the retraction, and closed the proceedings, but recorded that the complaint was instigated by an ‘unknown source,’ deliberately omitting Palni’s name despite it being clearly named in the retraction letter. The Petitioner appealed against the IC’s order in an Industrial Tribunal to quash the IC’s findings and hold Palni liable for action under Section 14 of the PoSH Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, holding that the retraction statement alone was insufficient to establish malicious intent and that no direct injury was caused to the Petitioner. The Petitioner challenged this dismissal before the High Court.
Issues Raised before the Court
- Was the Petitioner’s Section 18 appeal before the Industrial Tribunal maintainable?
- Did the IC err in recording ‘unknown source’ instead of naming Dattaprasad Palni?
- Can disciplinary action be directed against Dattaprasad Palni under Section 14 of the PoSH Act?
What the Court Said & Legal Analysis
On Maintainability of the Section 18 Appeal:
The Court held that the Tribunal was wrong to dismiss the appeal as not maintainable. Section 18 grants a statutory right of appeal to ‘any person aggrieved’ by the IC’s recommendations. It does not require the appellant to demonstrate direct injury. The Petitioner, falsely accused and aggrieved by an IC report that deliberately omitted the name of his accuser’s instigator, had clear standing to appeal. The Tribunal’s reasoning conflated the question of maintainability with the merits of the appeal.
On the IC’s ‘Unknown Source’ Finding:
The Court found that the IC committed a clear and inexplicable error where, having relied upon and accepted the retraction letter to close the proceedings, it could not selectively omit Palni’s name from its conclusion when he was explicitly named in that very letter as the instigator. The Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to directly modify the IC’s Inquiry Report, substituting ‘unknown source’ with a finding that Palni instigated the female colleague to file a false sexual harassment complaint against the Petitioner.
On Action Against the Instigator Under Section 14:
The Court drew an important statutory line. Section 14 of the PoSH Act applies only to the woman or person who made the complaint under Section 9 and not to third parties who may have instigated it. Since Palni was neither the aggrieved woman nor the maker of the complaint, Section 14 could not be invoked against him. The Court clarified, however, that the Petitioner remains at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings against Palni before any other forum permissible in law.
Key Takeaway for Organisations
This judgment makes three important contributions to PoSH jurisprudence:
- It confirms that an accused person aggrieved by an IC report has standing under Section 18.
- It establishes that an IC cannot selectively rely on evidence. If a retraction letter is accepted, the findings must reflect all the contents of that letter.
- It identifies a gap in the PoSH Act where the statute currently provides no mechanism to punish a third-party instigator of a false complaint through the PoSH framework itself.
4. Abhikshek Shah v. State of Haryana & Anr.
Punjab & Haryana High Court, Justice Kirti Singh
Brief Facts
The Petitioner, Director of a private company, had hired the complainant as a Business Manager. A dispute arose in October 2018 when the complainant sought four days’ medical leave ahead of an important company event. During an email exchange over the leave request, the Petitioner used the words “f*** off.” The complainant resigned the same day, and her resignation was accepted. Subsequently, the company issued a legal notice to her for breach of contract, following which she raised financial demands, including salary, legal fees, and a written apology. Over four months after the incident, in February 2019, she lodged an FIR against the Petitioner under Section 354-A IPC for sexual harassment through the use of sexually coloured remarks. The Petitioner sought quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC.
Issue Raised before the Court
- Whether the use of the expression “f*** off” in a workplace email constitutes sexual harassment under Section 354-A IPC, warranting continuation of criminal proceedings?
What the Court Said & Legal Analysis
The Court held that even taking the FIR’s allegations at face value and in their entirety, the essential ingredients of Section 354-A IPC were simply not made out.
Section 354-A requires that the act be intrinsically sexual in nature, unwelcome physical contact with explicit sexual overtures, demand for sexual favours, showing pornography, or making sexually coloured remarks. The Court drew a firm distinction between language that is abusive or uncouth and language that carries a sexual overtone directed at a woman’s modesty or sexuality. The expression in question, though “undeniably uncouth and discourteous,” did not in its ordinary sense carry any sexual insinuation. It arose from a work-related disagreement about leave, not from any sexual context or intent whatsoever.
The Court also emphasised contextual and pattern-based analysis. A solitary instance of an abusive remark, absent any element of sexual intent or pattern of harassing conduct, cannot meet the threshold for criminal culpability under a provision specifically designed to address gender-based harassment. Circumstantially, the Court also noted the four-month gap between the incident and the FIR, coinciding precisely with the legal notice for breach of contract and the complainant’s financial demands.
The FIR was quashed, subject to the Petitioner depositing Rs. 20,000/- in the Poor Patient Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh. This condition signals the Court’s acknowledgement that the language used, whilst not criminal, was unacceptable in a professional setting.
Key Takeaway for Organisations
This judgment draws an important and necessary line between workplace incivility and criminal sexual harassment. Not every abusive or offensive remark in an employment context qualifies as a ‘sexually coloured remark’ under Section 354-A IPC. The offence requires conduct that is sexual in nature or intent. Generic abuse, however inappropriate, does not meet that bar. For employers and HR practitioners, the practical lesson cuts both ways. The language was condemned even as the FIR was quashed, reinforcing that professional decorum is non-negotiable regardless of criminal liability.
5. Prof. Rasal Singh v. University of Delhi & Ors.
Delhi HC, Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
Brief Facts
The Petitioner, the Principal of Ramanujan College, University of Delhi, was accused of sexual harassment by three Assistant Professors between March and April 2025. The Deputy Registrar (Colleges), Delhi University (DU), constituted an ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee, which submitted a report, concluding that the charges were serious in nature and warranted further action. Based on this report, a Suspension Order was issued suspending the Petitioner pending IC inquiry. The Petitioner challenged the Fact-Finding Committee’s constitution and the suspension order before the Delhi High Court.
Issues Raised before the Court
- Can an employer suspend an employee in a PoSH case?
- Can a Deputy Registrar constitute an ad hoc Fact Finding Committee for a PoSH complaint?
- Is the Suspension Order stigmatic?
What the Court Said & Legal Analysis
On Suspension Power:
The Court held that the employer’s power to suspend is inherent, rooted in the master-servant relationship, and requires no express statutory conferment. Critically, Section 28 of the PoSH Act declares that the Act operates “in addition to and not in derogation of” other laws. This means the employer’s suspension power, governed by applicable service rules, survives intact alongside the PoSH Act. The fact that Section 12 of the PoSH Act does not provide for suspension is not a prohibition. That gap is filled by the employer’s pre-existing inherent power.
On the Ad Hoc Committee:
The PoSH Act creates an exclusive, self-contained mechanism. Sections 9 and 11 mandate that complaints shall go to the IC or Local Committee (LC), which shall inquire into them. The word ‘shall’ is mandatory. Constituting a parallel or pre-IC ad hoc body directly violates this mandate. The Court further held that such committees, having no governing rules, no statutory timelines, and no assured impartiality, also violate both pillars of natural justice. Additionally, they risk delaying the substantive PoSH inquiry, undermining complainant confidentiality protections under Sections 16 and 17, and rendering the PoSH Act nugatory.
On Stigma:
A suspension order must be neutral. The employer’s role at that stage is limited to determining whether the employee’s continuance would prejudice the inquiry. The Suspension Order here used the phrases “serious misconduct and harassment” and “gravity of the matter,” which the Court found constituted an impermissible pre-adjudication of unproven allegations, capable of causing reputational damage. This compromises the constitutional presumption of innocence. The Court set aside the order but granted the College liberty to pass a fresh, non-stigmatic suspension order.
Key Takeaway for Organisations
Upon receiving a PoSH complaint, refer it directly to the IC. No ad hoc pre-inquiry is permissible. If suspension is warranted, the order must be brief and neutral, stating only that the employee stands suspended pending IC inquiry, without characterising the nature or gravity of the allegations.
Conclusion
The April 2026 judgments reflect the courts’ growing sophistication in interpreting the PoSH Act. For organisations navigating PoSH compliance, these judgements collectively underscore one overarching message: the statute demands rigour at every stage, from the constitution of a properly composed IC to the form of any suspension order, from the integrity of the inquiry process to the binding implementation of findings. Shortcuts, ad hoc arrangements, and procedurally defective orders carry real legal risk.
Strengthen Your PoSH Compliance Today
Navigating PoSH obligations requires expertise that goes beyond awareness. The judgments above make clear that procedural lapses carry serious consequences for organisations, IC members, and employees alike.
PoSH at Work provides end-to-end PoSH compliance solutions, whether you are building your PoSH framework from the ground up or strengthening an existing one. Our team can help you meet the standard the courts now demand.